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Abstract - Advances in genetic research promise to loosen the trad-
eoff between progressivity and effi ciency by allowing tax liability (or 
transfer eligibility) to be based in part on immutable characteristics 
of individuals (“tags”) that are correlated with their expected lot in 
life. Use of genetic tags would reduce reliance on tax bases (such as 
income) that are subject to individual choices and, therefore, subject 
to ineffi cient distortion to those choices. If genetic information can 
be used by private employers and insurers, the case for basing tax 
in part on it becomes more compelling, as genetic inequalities would 
be exacerbated by market forces. 
INTRODUCTION
The other essays in this volume make clear that the future of taxation depends importantly on innovations in the 
gathering and processing of information. As the so–called 
information economy continues to evolve, systems of 
taxation, which obviously require detailed and accurate 
information in order to function, will have to adapt as 
well.1 In parallel with these innovations in the processing 
of traditional tax–related information, there have also been 
stunning technological developments in the identifi cation 
of new information about individual human characteristics 
that may also have profound implications for taxation. We 
are speaking about the human genome and the vast amount 
of information that is now or soon will be available merely 
from a sample of a person’s genetic material. Recent advances 
in genetic research have captured the public’s imagina-
tion and promise to revolutionize our approach to treating 
human disease.2 The question we wish to pursue, however, 
is how such advances in genetic research might bear on tax 
policy. 
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 1 See Slemrod (2006) for a discussion of the implications for tax policy of 
innovations in information technology.
 2 Every few weeks a news story appears, reporting that scientists have discov-
ered, or confi rmed, the link between some illness and a particular gene, from 
Huntington’s disease (which has long been known to be a hereditary disease) 
to cancer, heart disease, schizophrenia, and, most recently, diabetes and Al-
zheimer’s. For example, see Langreth and Herper (2007) and Wade (2007a, 
2007b). According to the GeneTests Web site (www.geneclinics.org), funded by 
the National Institutes of Health, as of June 4, 2008 there were 1,558 diseases for 
which tests are available, 1,272 of which are clinical and 286 for research only.
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To explore that question, we consider 
how progress in genetics—specifi cally, 
the proliferation of knowledge about the 
human genome—may infl uence the feasi-
bility and desirability of a tax that is based 
on individual human endowments, or, to 
use the economist’s preferred term, a tax 
based on ability. The terms “endowment” 
or “ability” in this context refer to a mea-
sure of an individual taxpayer’s innate 
lifetime earning capacity or the taxpayer’s 
potential wage rate—an approximation 
of the income that an individual could 
generate during her lifetime if she chose 
to pursue her highest valued use, as that 
use is defi ned by the market. (Below we 
will explain why “endowment” may 
be a more descriptive term for what we 
have in mind than the term “ability”; 
however, consistent with the literature 
in this area, we will use the terms largely 
interchangeably.) 
According to tax policy commentators, 
the benefi t of basing tax liability on indi-
vidual endowment rather than on, say, 
income or consumption would be a reduc-
tion in the effi ciency cost of raising tax rev-
enue for any given level of distributional 
consequences. The effi ciency benefi t of an 
endowment tax3 would be the same as that 
of any lump–sum tax: because the endow-
ment tax targets innate characteristics of 
individuals and, thus, would not depend 
on individual choices, the tax would avoid 
labor/leisure—and any other—distor-
tions and, hence, would avoid the dead-
weight losses associated with alternative 
taxes such as those based on income or 
consumption. In addition, an endowment 
tax—unlike some other lump–sum taxes, 
such as a head tax—would allow the tax 
burden to be distributed in a manner 
that many would consider distribution-
ally fair.4 Under an endowment tax, the 
greater is a person’s innate endowment to 
command and enjoy economic resources, 
the greater her tax burden would be. And 
the less her endowment is, the less her tax 
burden would be.5
Everyone agrees, however, that a primary 
diffi culty with an endowment tax—and a 
diffi culty that many commentators regard 
as insurmountable—is its impracticality. 
How could the taxing authority ever reli-
ably determine an individual’s innate ability 
to produce and enjoy income? What sort 
of test would the government use to deter-
mine a person’s innate lifetime earning 
potential?6 This is where genetic technology 
enters, or may someday enter, the picture. 
The rapid technological progress in the 
understanding of the human genome may 
eventually provide a reliable way to esti-
mate the value of something that approxi-
mates an individual’s endowment—using 
the person’s genetic information. That is, 
insofar as there are human genetic markers 
that are statistically correlated with lifetime 
income or other measures of well–being, 
such markers might be used in a tax–and–
transfer regime. One form a genetic endow-
ment tax might take would be as a separate, 
 3 Although we generally refer to an endowment “tax,” we mean this to include net transfers, so the reader 
should be thinking of a tax–and–transfer system that depends in part on an indicator of genetic endowment.
 4 This aspect of an endowment tax is shared by differential head taxes, such as those used in the Middle Ages 
when there was a fi xed tax levy that varied only by one’s station in life: peasant, noble, etc. 
 5 Because we are applying a welfarist framework in this paper, when we use the term “distributionally fair” or “dis-
tributional equity,” we mean a distribution of resources that is consistent with maximizing overall social welfare. 
As we explain more fully below, the welfarist case for redistributive transfers generally assumes the diminishing 
marginal utility of income for all individuals and, more generally, that individuals’ utility functions are homogeneous.
 6 For example, one might consider how to implement an ability tax based on an aptitude test as a rough measure 
of a child’s innate intelligence. One problem with such a test is the diffi culty of selecting an appropriate testing 
age, when the child would be old enough to produce meaningful predictions of his/her income–earning ability 
but young enough to be immune to his/her parents’ possible efforts at manipulation of the system (such as 
by urging the child, unlike with other tests, to pick the “wrong” answers.) Basing the tax on a test like the SAT 
would exacerbate the manipulability problem and raises the issue that one’s potential score depends on human 
capital investment decisions previously made by parents and child, and for that reason is not immutable. 
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free–standing tax–and–transfer program, 
with the taxes or transfers calculated at 
birth (if not earlier) and actual remittances 
made throughout a person’s life.7 But other 
approaches are possible. Instead, the results 
of the genetic endowment test could simply 
be used as an input in the determination of 
an individual’s tax liability, for example, 
as blindness, age and marital status are 
used in the current U.S. income tax system. 
Under such a system, genetic information 
would be used as a “tag,” in the language 
of Akerlof (1978). Akerlof showed that 
any immutable characteristic of an indi-
vidual that is correlated with ability can 
improve the equity–effi ciency tradeoff of 
a tax system, because the use of such tags 
can produce some degree of redistribution 
without any efficiency cost (due to the 
immutability of the characteristic), thus 
reducing the need for distortionary redis-
tributive tax instruments (which are not 
based on immutable characteristics), such 
as the graduated income tax.8
So why do we not already have a genetic 
endowment tax? For one thing, we do not 
presently have a test for overall genetic 
endowment. Despite all of the recent 
advances in genetic testing, scientists have 
yet to isolate the aspects of a genetic profi le 
that measure an individual’s innate capac-
ity to produce income or well–being. There 
is, of course, a sense in which the existence 
of such a gene or combination of genes is 
problematic, even as a conceptual matter. 
The correlation of a particular genetic char-
acteristic (which is innate) with lifetime 
income or lifetime well–being will depend 
on a number of contingent, external fac-
tors. Thus, whether a specifi c genetic pro-
fi le will lead to higher lifetime well–being 
will depend on how the economy in which 
the person lives values the particular 
attribute associated with that profi le. For 
example, whether a gene or combination 
of genes and epigenes for mathematical 
profi ciency, if there is such a thing, would 
correlate with a relatively high lifetime 
income will depend upon the value placed 
on such a skill by the economy in which 
that individual happens to live.
Notwithstanding that qualifi cation, we 
can still imagine science some day pro-
gressing to a point at which it is possible 
to identify signifi cant and stable statistical 
correlations between a given genetic pro-
fi le and lifetime earnings or even overall 
well–being. At least, such a development 
is not beyond our imagination. Indeed, 
according to some reports, researchers 
have in fact uncovered evidence of a gene 
that appears at least to infl uence some 
aspects of intelligence9 and have certainly 
identifi ed genes that affect one’s propen-
sity to acquire debilitating diseases, both 
of which would seem to be characteristics 
that would be importantly relevant to 
measuring lifetime well–being in any 
likely future economy. Thus, in the spirit of 
exploration and speculation that inspired 
this conference on the future of taxation 
and technology, our paper will explore 
how genetic information might be used 
in some future tax–and–transfer regime. 
Not every conclusion or speculation in 
this paper, however, is pure science fi ction. 
Some of the existing genetic research that 
identifi es links between particular genes or 
collections of genes and numerous debili-
tating and sometimes deadly diseases 
could also be used as part of an endowment 
tax regime. Insofar as poor health suggests 
lower overall well–being, an endowment 
tax regime based on health–related genes 
could be social–welfare enhancing.10 This 
conclusion is strengthened by the fact that 
 7 Compare this to the proposal made in Ackerman and Alstott (1999) to grant a fi xed sum of $80,000 to all people 
when they reach the age of 21 and who have also fi nished their high school studies.
 8 On this see Kaplow and Shavell (1994) and Sanchirico (2001).
 9 See Tang, Shimizu, Dube, Rampon, Kerchner, Zhuo, Liu, and Tsien (1999), Burdick, Lencz, Funke, Finn, 
Szeszko, Kane, Kucherlapati, and Melhotra (2006), and Nesser, Boodoo, Bouchard, Boykin, Brody, Ceci, Halpern, 
Loehlin, Perloff, Sternberg, and Urbina (1996).
10 This requires that, other things equal, the social marginal utility of resources increases with declining health status.
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there is a strong correlation between health 
and income. In this paper we sketch out 
how such a genetic endowment tax might 
be designed.
Even if a genetic endowment tax were to 
become a practical possibility, there would 
still be critics of such a policy. For some of 
those critics, the taxation of human poten-
tial—as opposed to taxing the realization 
of that potential as, say, income—is per se 
wrong, because such a tax would in some 
sense force individuals to work who prefer 
not to work, to work more than they desire, 
or to work in occupations that they other-
wise would not choose. This is sometimes 
called the problem of “talent slavery” or 
“wage slavery.”11 For other commentators 
the case for adopting an endowment tax is 
problematic because, depending on one’s 
assumptions about taxpayer utility func-
tions, it is not clear that an endowment 
tax will increase overall social welfare.12 
Although we do believe (and argue below) 
that some (though not all) of these criticisms 
of endowment taxation have been over-
stated, we do not in this essay attempt to 
offer a systematic defense of an endowment 
tax. Indeed, we do not argue for or against 
any particular change in policy. Rather, the 
point of the essay is to describe what a par-
ticular type of endowment tax—what we 
call a genetic endowment tax—might look 
like in some not–too–distant future world, 
and to begin an examination of its advan-
tages and disadvantages. Thus, this paper is 
meant not to advance any particular policy 
change, but to kindle the imagination. 
In that spirit, we highlight one rationale 
for the adoption of an endowment tax that 
has not been discussed in the economic or 
philosophical literatures on the subject. 
Even if one agrees with the fundamental 
criticisms of the genetic endowment tax, 
once the relevant genetic tests become 
available, government policymakers will 
inevitably face the question of how to 
respond. This is because, even if the gov-
ernment does nothing, even if no genetic 
endowment tax regime is adopted, private 
employers (in deciding whom to hire and 
on what terms) and private insurance 
markets (in deciding whom to insure and 
on what terms) can be expected, in the 
absence of an effective legal prohibition, 
to incorporate such genetic tests into their 
hiring and underwriting practices. Such 
market responses would tend to exacer-
bate existing inequalities of well–being 
that fl ow from genetic differences.13 
As we explain below, the government 
might anticipate or react to these various 
developments in a number of different 
ways. One possibility, to which much 
legal scholarship has attended,14 would 
be a regulatory response; specifi cally, the 
government could adopt laws limiting 
the use of genetic information by insurers 
and employers. In fact, such genetic anti–
discrimination rules have been adopted 
in many states in the U.S.15 Also, federal 
law restricts the use of genetic information 
in certain situations by insurers seek-
ing to exclude pre–existing conditions.16 
In addition, President Clinton in 2000 
11 See Rakowski (2000), Rawls (2001), Murphy and Nagel (2002), Zelenak (2006), and Hasen (2007).
12 See Shaviro (2000).
13 In addition, private genetic–testing companies will enter the market. Rugnetta, Russell, and Moreno (2008) 
note that, for example, DNADirect, Inc. offers 17 condition–specifi c tests (such as for blood clotting or diabetes 
risk) of varying cost directly to a private consumer. 
14 See Rothenberg (1995), Reilly (1997), and Diver and Cohen (2001).
15 For example, 47 states currently have laws that restrict the use of genetic information by health insurance 
companies. Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and Washington appear to be the only exceptions.  See the National 
Human Genome Research Institute Policy (NGRIP) and Legislation Database at http://www.genome.gov/
PolicyEthics/LegDatabase/pubsearch.cfm.  See also National Conference of State Legislatures tables on health 
insurance (at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndishlth.htm).
16 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), enacted in 1996, prohibits health insur-
ance companies, under certain circumstances, from excluding individuals from group health coverage on the 
basis of pre–existing conditions. The law specifi cally states that genetic information alone cannot constitute 
a pre–existing condition.
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issued an executive order (Executive 
Order 13145) prohibiting federal agen-
cies from obtaining genetic information 
about their employees or job applicants 
and from using genetic information in 
hiring and promotion decisions. In May 
2008, Congress overwhelmingly passed 
(and President Bush promised to sign) 
the Genetic Information Nondiscrimina-
tion Act, which prohibits health insurance 
companies from using genetic information 
to deny benefi ts or raise premiums for 
individual policies, and sets large fi nes for 
employers who use genetic information in 
making decisions about hiring, fi ring, or 
compensation. The bill does not address 
discrimination by long–term care insurers 
or life insurers.
Such rules, we argue, can be understood 
as a form of indirect (somewhat hidden) 
genetic endowment tax–and–transfer 
regime. Alternatively, the government 
could allow insurers and employers to 
use genetic information to sort employ-
ees (that is, eliminate the existing genetic 
antidiscrimination laws) and could then 
implement a direct system of endowment 
taxation and transfer based on genetic 
information. 
If, however, the government were to 
choose a third path—to allow genetic 
discrimination by repealing any existing 
genetic antidiscrimination laws without 
adopting an explicit genetic endowment 
tax–and–transfer regime as a replace-
ment—we explain how the market itself 
might respond yet again, perhaps in the 
form of what we call “endowment insur-
ance,” which would be, in effect, a market–
provided form of endowment taxation. 
Whichever of these paths is taken, our 
general conclusion is that the increasing 
availability of genetic information to tax 
administrators, and the use of genetic 
information by private employers and 
insurers, will affect the optimal design of 
a tax–and–transfer regime.17
A SELECTIVE REVIEW OF THE 
ENDOWMENT TAX LITERATURE
From Optimal Income Taxes 
to Endowment Taxes to Tagging
Tax theorists have long struggled with 
the problem of designing a tax regime 
that balances the competing concerns of 
allocative effi ciency and distributional 
equity. It is well known that, assuming 
the conditions of a competitive market, 
the only truly effi cient tax–one that does 
not distort decisions—is a lump–sum 
tax, which means a tax that does not vary 
based on individual choices or behavior. 
The most straightforward lump–sum tax, 
the uniform lump–sum tax (or head tax) 
under which everyone pays the same 
amount, is universally considered dis-
tributively unacceptable. This conclusion 
can be based on any of several normative 
theories. For example, under a simple 
utilitarian approach that assumes that all 
individuals in society have identical car-
dinal utility functions that refl ect a dimin-
ishing marginal utility of money, some 
degree of redistribution from the rich to 
the poor would be social–welfare maxi-
mizing. Indeed, if we ignore the incentive 
effects of such transfers, a simple utilitar-
ian framework would suggest a policy of 
full equalization of wealth.18 Of course, 
once we allow for the fact that taxes and 
transfers do affect incentives, including 
labor–market incentives, it becomes clear 
17 One important issue raised by the use of genetic information that we do not address in this paper is the 
concern about privacy. Some individuals may object to any use by the government or by private parties not 
authorized by them of their genetic information as a fundamental violation of privacy or because of the fear 
that it might be used in ways that are initially unintended or may end up being passed on to parties who are 
not supposed to have it. Such concerns would have to be addressed systematically before any tax or transfer 
system based on genetic information would be viable.
18 This was fi rst pointed out by Edgeworth (1897).
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that redistributive transfers come at a cost 
that must be taken into account. 
That is precisely what the optimal tax 
literature does. It develops models of 
optimal—i.e., social–welfare maximiz-
ing—tax regimes that take into account 
both the social welfare benefi ts (due to 
redistribution) and the social welfare 
costs (due to distorting behavior away 
from taxed activities) of those regimes. 
Critically, almost all of this literature 
assumes that an individual’s endowment, 
or innate earning potential, cannot be 
directly observed by the taxing authority. 
Thus, Mirrlees’ path–breaking 1971 article 
and nearly all that followed it focused 
on the design of an optimal income tax, 
on the theory that income, which is the 
product of unobservable endowment and 
unobservable effort, is in fact observable. 
Scholars working in the optimal tax fi eld, 
including Mirrlees, however, have long 
acknowledged that if earning potential 
could somehow be observed, then any 
redistributive tax regime could in theory 
be made more effi cient by switching to 
a system of taxes and transfers based 
directly on ability.19 The intuition behind 
this conclusion is simple: for any tax 
regime that redistributes on the basis 
of income (or on the basis of any other 
observable characteristic, such as wealth 
or consumption, that is the product of 
endowment and individual choices such 
as labor effort), there would be an alter-
native endowment–tax regime that could 
achieve the same level of redistribution at 
lower cost in terms of distorted choices. 
The appeal of an endowment tax, 
therefore, is that in theory such a tax 
can be calculated on the basis of an indi-
vidual’s earning potential irrespective 
of her choices or effort, thus eliminating 
any distortion in the choices between 
work and leisure or any other choice 
whose terms are distorted by, say, an 
income or consumption tax. Similarly, the 
endowment tax appeals to some liberal 
egalitarian philosophers who argue that 
inequality attributable to “brute luck”—
of which differences in innate earning 
power would be an example—is morally 
arbitrary and (putting aside the wage 
slavery problem for the moment) ought 
to be eliminated through redistributive 
policy, whereas inequality attributable 
to informed choices are “deserved” and, 
hence, not appropriate targets for redis-
tributive transfers.20 
In this essay, we consider a relatively 
modest application of the endowment tax 
idea based on Akerlof’s (1978) observation 
that, even in a system of distortionary 
taxes, if the tax policymaker can identify 
“tags”—observable characteristics of indi-
viduals that correlate with ability and that 
are not a matter of choice—those tags can 
be used to lower the welfare cost of any 
distortionary tax regime. The particular 
context in which Akerlof wrote was the 
debate over how to deal with the problem 
of poverty; specifi cally, whether to use a 
negative income tax by itself or whether 
instead to supplement a negative income 
tax with adjustments or transfers based 
on various tags such as age, blindness, or 
disabled status. What Akerlof showed was 
that the use of such tags can indeed lower 
the cost of redistribution. Thus, any extent 
of redistribution accomplished through 
tagging rather than differentials in income 
tax rates produces less overall distortion 
of choices, such as labor supply decisions. 
A tax system that includes tags, how-
ever, is only as good as the tags that are 
chosen. A useful tag has three qualities: it 
must be observable by the taxing author-
ity, it must be immutable, and it must be 
correlated with attainable well–being. The 
absence of any one of these factors under-
19 An early treatment in the economics literature is Allingham (1975).
20 See Dworkin (1981a, 1981b).
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mines its usefulness as a tag. Indeed, a 
highly imperfect tag will almost certainly 
introduce more capriciousness into the 
distribution of tax liability than is justifi ed 
by its effi ciency benefi ts, and should not 
be used. This is not to say, of course, that 
all three of these factors must be perfect. 
The tag, if not directly observable, must at 
least be something that can be estimated 
with minimal error. There will always be 
the problem of individuals attempting to 
falsify their tag status—people pretend-
ing to be disabled, for example—and 
such fraud obviously inhibits the social 
gains available from the use of tags. (Of 
course, such fraud is a problem with any 
tax base, including income or wealth, 
and there is little reason a priori to expect 
the problem to be more pronounced 
with tags.) In addition, a tag need not be 
totally immutable (even blindness can be 
self–induced), but it must be relatively 
so—relative, again, to the other options, 
such as income. And finally, the cor-
relation between the tag and attainable 
well–being also need not be perfect. Just 
good enough. Overall, the observability, 
immutability, and attainable well–being 
correlation need only be good enough that 
the social welfare gains from basing taxes 
and transfers on the tag exceed the welfare 
losses.21 Besides the tags mentioned by 
Akerlof—age, blindness, and disability 
status—commentators have considered 
height (Mankiw and Weinzierl, 2007) or 
even race (Logue, 2004). 
Note that a useful tag need only be 
correlated with the unobservable ability 
to produce and enjoy well–being, and 
it need not explicitly measure overall 
ability or even a component of it. If ice 
cream consumption were correlated 
with income–earning ability, allowing 
tax liability to depend on ice cream con-
sumption would reduce the ineffi ciency 
for any given amount of redistribution, 
even though no one would argue that 
it measures ability or a component of it. 
Thus, although we will argue below that 
genetic information may at some point in 
the future measure expected ability to earn 
(and enjoy) income, the tagging argument 
does not require that genetic information 
actually measure ability, but only that the 
genetic index be correlated with ability.22
Criticisms of Endowment Taxation 
(and Responses)
Some commentators in the legal and 
philosophical literatures object on prin-
ciple to an endowment tax. The idea 
seems to be that, under an endowment 
tax, high–ability people whose tastes 
tend to leisure rather than goods would 
be “forced” to work to pay their tax bills; 
whereas, under an income tax, in contrast, 
a high–ability person can choose not to 
work and, thus, avoid paying any tax if 
she so decides. Since every tax produces 
some form of this income effect, however, 
it is not clear why the particular income 
effect associated with an endowment tax 
would be especially problematic. That 
is, whenever an income or consumption 
tax is adopted (or the rates of an existing 
income or consumption tax are raised), it 
can be argued that people are “forced” to 
work more than before the change to the 
extent they want to maintain a given level 
of consumption.23 Yet we do not generally 
hear “wage–slavery” or “talent–slavery” 
21 Stern (1982) formalizes the choice between a distortionary tax based on an easily observable indicator of ability 
such as income and a tax based on an immutable tag that is, however, observed with error.
22 A gene–based tag seems less susceptible to the criticism made by Mankiw and Weinzierl (2007) that such a tax 
is intuitively unappealing because it is not targeting the “true” source of inequality, as would be true of height 
as a tag in a modern economy in which the non–tall are the object of discrimination but not in an economy 
based on “tall fruit–bearing trees.”
23 Others have made this basic point. See Kaplow (1994), Shaviro (2000), and Stark (2005). 
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complaints in connection with those 
changes.24 
A more subtle, and potentially more 
serious, critique of the endowment 
tax comes from within the utilitarian 
framework itself. This critique raises the 
following question: can we be sure that 
an endowment tax will increase overall 
social welfare if we relax the traditional 
assumption (sometimes implicit and 
sometimes explicit in economic models of 
the endowment tax) that taxpayers have 
identical utility functions with respect to 
work and leisure? Thus, when tax policy 
commentators applying a utilitarian 
framework argue in favor of some degree 
of redistributive transfer from the better 
off to the less well off, they often adopt the 
assumption that all individuals have iden-
tical utility functions, at least with respect 
to goods (income) versus leisure, and they 
assume (as is standard) that those utility 
functions are concave. The result is that 
overall utility is maximized when income 
(or, under an endowment tax, potential 
income) is redistributed from rich to poor, 
until the marginal utility of income is 
equalized across the population. But the 
analysis becomes much more complicated 
and the result less certain when we relax 
those assumptions. If, for example, some 
otherwise identical individuals experience 
unusually high disutility (or unusually 
high utility) from working, it is less clear 
that overall welfare could be improved by 
a regime of endowment taxation.25 That is, 
if we do not know that high–income peo-
ple value the next dollar earned at least 
somewhat less than low–income people, 
the case for redistribution—at least under 
a utilitarian framework—is thrown into 
doubt. Of course, a similar objection can 
be raised against the redistributive effects 
of a progressive income or consumption 
tax. This objection, therefore, seems more 
appropriately directed at the idea of redis-
tribution more generally.  
Although many of the recent discus-
sions of an endowment tax have focused 
on extreme versions of the tax (such as 
replacing the income tax with an endow-
ment tax), which presumably helps to 
explain the preoccupation with wage 
slavery, we focus in this paper instead 
on a more modest use of the endowment 
tax. Specifi cally, we consider the use of 
tags to increase the effi ciency of an exist-
ing redistributive tax regime, such as a 
progressive income tax. Of course, even 
the use of this type of tag can be criticized. 
One objection that is sometimes raised 
is that, even if the tag satisfi es the three 
24 In addition, the argument that an individual can avoid paying income tax simply by deciding not to work 
at all, or can avoid paying consumption tax by not consuming, is misguided. Everyone has to produce some 
income and engage in some consumption to survive; and when they do, the income or consumption tax will 
be there to get them, just as the endowment tax would be. And it is not a response to this observation to 
argue that an individual with a very small amount of income or with very low levels of consumption might 
be exempted from an income tax or consumption tax (either through personal exemptions or exemptions for 
expenditures on necessities, respectively). Such an exemption could just as easily be adopted as part of an 
endowment tax regime. Likewise, it seems nonresponsive to argue that under an income or consumption tax, 
but not under an endowment tax, an individual can avoid taxation by not engaging in market transactions 
and by instead limiting her consumption to self–provided goods and services. This distinction too, however, 
depends on what amounts to an exemption in the existing models of real world income and consumption 
taxes for imputed income. A similar exemption could be made a part of an endowment tax, with all of the 
associated benefi ts and costs of such a policy. Alternatively, as Kaplow (1994) has suggested, an endowment 
tax that is capped at some percentage of an individual’s actual income would achieve some of the effi ciency 
benefi ts of the endowment tax while eliminating entirely the concerns of forced labor. Of course, how much 
of the effi ciency benefi ts of the endowment tax would be achieved would depend on the percentage used for 
the cap and on the difference between individuals’ potential income and their actual income. See Zelenak 
(2006). 
25 This observation about endowment taxation has been made before, e.g., in Shaviro (2000). It is especially 
problematic if the high–ability people on average have relatively high preferences for goods versus leisure. 
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criteria discussed above—observability, 
immutability, and correlation with attain-
able utility—redistribution with respect to 
that tag can be stigmatizing. For example, 
Mankiw and Weinzierl (2007) suggest 
that, although height reliably correlates 
with lifetime earnings (and, of course, 
is observable and largely—although 
not completely—immutable), the use of 
height as a tag should be avoided because 
it suggests that the tall are in some sense 
more “able” than the short when, in fact, 
a more likely explanation for the correla-
tion with lifetime earnings is employment 
discrimination against the non–tall. How-
ever, even if discrimination is the cause, it 
is not clear why that conclusion would cut 
against modest redistribution from tall to 
short. It does suggest, however, that the 
term “ability” may be misleading, in that 
the term suggests different levels of innate 
talent or skill rather than, more generically 
(and less normatively), different levels of 
potential expected lifetime earnings. What 
this discussion suggests is that, in policy 
and academic discussions of endowment 
taxation and tagging, care should be taken 
to use the term “ability” only where it is 
clearly appropriate. 
Perhaps the most serious objection to 
introducing a system of tags into a tax-
and-transfer regime is the worry that the 
three factors described above are not satis-
fi ed. And this is a serious objection indeed. 
The remainder of this paper addresses the 
possibility of a future world in which tax 
policymakers, as well as private actors, 
are able, through genetic technology, to 
identify genetic markers that meet these 
criteria.
THE GENETIC ENDOWMENT TA(X/G)
The Potential–Earnings and Potential–
Health Indices
Imagine that a series of genetic tests are 
invented that enable scientists, with the 
help of statisticians and economists, to 
develop a reliable estimate of the statisti-
cal correlation between an individual’s 
genome and her prospects for lifetime 
earnings.26 Based on these genetic tests 
policymakers can produce an “endow-
ment index” refl ecting the overall poten-
tial expected value of an individual’s 
innate endowment to produce income. 
To what extent that potential is translated 
into income will depend on many fac-
tors, including the individual’s tastes for 
leisure versus market consumption and 
immediate versus postponed consump-
tion. 
To further refi ne the analysis, imagine 
that the overall genetic endowment index 
might be broken into two separate but 
related indices for every individual. The 
fi rst index corresponds to an individual’s 
lifetime earning potential, which we 
assume to be an approximation of the 
individual’s ability to produce income 
over her lifetime. The second index 
relates to the individual’s lifetime poten-
tial health status. A less favorable health 
status reduces attainable utility for a 
given income and, we assume, increases 
the social marginal utility of income. As 
we explain below, both indices could be 
further broken down into sub–indices. 
In addition, the potential–earnings and 
health–status indices can be combined 
to determine a single genetic index that 
26 We recognize that the relationship between any observable characteristic of an organism and its genome (i.e., 
all of the hereditary information usually encoded in the DNA, including both the genes and the non–coding 
sequences of the DNA) is characterized by great complexity involving interaction between many genes, gene 
products and environmental signaling. This interaction may involve many, even thousands, of genes for any 
common disease like cancer or heart disease, and will also be a function of both one’s personal natural history 
and one’s present environmental setting, so that even in simplifi ed cases, where genetic connections may be 
traced, the genes will have different effects in different environments. There is no question that appropriately 
using genetic information as a tag for potential lifetime earnings is exceedingly complex, but given the enor-
mously fast pace of scientifi c progress in this area, it may be a viable option some day. 
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is assumed to be (again, as a result of 
scientifi c progress) completely observ-
able, utterly immutable (putting aside the 
possibility of genetic engineering), and 
closely correlated with potential utility.
Now consider how the potential–earn-
ings index might further be broken down 
into sub–indices that would correspond to 
the components of innate earning poten-
tial. For example, imagine the day when 
there is a genetic marker, ascertainable at 
birth or earlier, for an individual’s ability 
to do complex reasoning and mathemat-
ics, skills that may correspond with higher 
lifetime earning power. Likewise, there 
may some day be genetic markers for the 
ability to work well with other people, 
the ability to inspire loyalty among one’s 
co–workers, the ability to persevere in 
the face of adversity, and even the abil-
ity to discern profitable opportunities 
from unprofi table ones or to distinguish 
trustworthy partners from scoundrels. 
And let us assume that all of these abili-
ties turn out to be positively correlated 
with lifetime earnings. In addition, there 
may someday be genetic markers (such 
as, apparently, the genetic profi le associ-
ated with height) that correlate strongly 
with potential earnings, but that are not 
representative of differences in ability. 
Rather, the differences may be attributable 
to discrimination or something else that 
remains undiscovered. 
Each of these genetic sub–markers for 
potential earnings could then be used 
to produce a sub–index for each char-
acteristic that, for the sake of argument, 
we presume is normalized around some 
societal average with respect to that char-
acteristic. Thus, an individual might have 
a positive, zero, or negative sub–index 
for mathematical ability, perseverance, 
height, and so on, depending on which 
genetic markers she has. All of these 
sub–indices could then be combined to 
arrive at a single potential–earnings index. 
The potential–health–status index 
would be similar in conception. Suppose 
that genetic research progresses to the 
point that scientists can identify the par-
ticular genes and other genetic material 
that are linked to substantially increased 
risk of certain serious diseases, conditions, 
or disabilities that tend to produce some 
combination of (a) loss of earning power, 
(b) unusually high medical bills (higher 
than some average level of medical 
expense), and (c) substantial reductions 
in the individual’s quality of life (in terms 
of pain, general misery, and loss of ability 
to enjoy previously enjoyed activities). 
This index, too, could be defi ned with 
reference to some average level of lifetime 
health, which in turn would be based on 
some average level of risk of contracting 
various diseases.27 
One function of such an index in a 
genetic endowment tax–and–transfer 
regime would be to enable further refi ne-
ment of the estimate of an individual’s 
lifetime potential earnings. After all, it 
is easier for a healthy person to fi nd and 
keep a job than an unhealthy person. In 
addition, individuals with below–aver-
age health, even if their employment 
prospects are unaffected, may need 
additional resources in the form of medi-
cal care merely to restore them to some 
average baseline level of wellness or well–
being. (This fact, of course, is the point 
of health insurance: to shift resources 
from the healthy to the unhealthy state 
of the world.) For these reasons, just as 
lawmakers might reasonably decide that 
social welfare would be increased by 
making transfers from individuals with 
high potential earnings to those with low 
27 As with the potential–earnings index, the potential–health index could be further broken down into sub–indices 
by disease or condition. Thus, an individual could have a positive, zero, or negative index for, say, cancer (or 
lung cancer or a particular type of lung cancer, etc.) based on whether her likelihood of contracting cancer 
during her lifetime was less than, equal to, or greater than some baseline level of risk. Separate sub–indices 
for every major disease could be developed, which could then be combined to produce a single health index.
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potential earnings, they might reach a 
similar conclusion about transfers from 
those with better genetic potential for 
good health to those with a worse genetic 
health. 
These two indices might then be 
summed to produce one endowment 
index, which might then be used in an 
endowment tax regime to achieve some 
level of non–distortionary redistribu-
tion. Transfers could be made from those 
with a positive endowment index to 
those with a negative endowment index. 
Furthermore, we might assign gradu-
ated rates to both the health–related and 
potential–earnings–related taxes and 
transfers, depending on how far above 
or below the baseline the particular index 
falls, such that those with, for example, a 
higher level of potential earnings would 
pay a higher percentage of those earnings 
in tax. Alternatively, going back to the 
tags analysis from above, one might use 
the endowment indices as adjustments to 
the already existing income tax system. 
This adjustment could be in the form of a 
deduction or a credit, possibly refundable 
as with the EITC. Again, the advantage 
of either approach—the free–standing 
endowment tax–and–transfer regime or 
the endowment adjustment to the exist-
ing tax regime—is that it would allow us 
to achieve a given distributional target 
while reducing the level of progressivity 
in the existing income tax system, thus 
reducing overall tax–induced distortions 
in the system.28 
If for some reason policymakers pre-
ferred to have a redistributive regime that 
took into account only some of the various 
factors that affect lifetime potential earn-
ings or lifetime health status, they could 
leave out some of the various sub–indices 
discussed above. The endowment index 
could be designed to include or exclude 
whatever combination of the various 
sub–indices the policymakers thought 
was appropriate. Thus, if policymakers 
decided that differences in lifetime earn-
ings associated with differences in height 
or hair color or facial features should not 
be reduced by redistributive transfers, 
they could leave those factors out of the 
index. The point of collapsing, or building, 
all of the various genetic differences into 
a single index is not to suggest that all 
genetically affected differences in earnings 
or health potential are the same. Obvi-
ously they are not. Rather, the point is that 
insofar as a transfer of cash is to be used 
as a redistributive tool for any given set 
of genetic differences, it only makes sense 
to reduce those differences to a single 
metric for the purpose of calculating the 
redistributive transfer.
Implementation Issues
For such an endowment tax–and–trans-
fer regime to work, policymakers would 
obviously need to overcome numerous, 
possibly insurmountable, conceptual and 
technological difficulties. Some genes 
may have both welfare–enhancing and 
28 The current deduction for extraordinary medical expenses and the deduction for large casualty losses can 
be understood as just this sort of adjustment of unusually large consumption needs. The difference with the 
genetic health index would, in theory, be that the adjustment would be based on an individual’s innate (genetic) 
propensity to contract certain diseases, thus eliminating any distortionary (moral hazard) effects that might 
accompany the current approach. The gene–based argument should not be thought of as a replacement for 
the realization–based deduction, though, unless the genetic test can predict outcomes without error. 
  Louis Kaplow has suggested to us the comparison to Social Security Disability Insurance, a payroll–tax–
funded program that provides income to people unable to work because of a disability until their condition 
improves, and which offers income payments if their condition does not improve. A person qualifi es if, 
among other conditions, they have a physical or mental condition that prevents them from engaging in any 
“substantial gainful work,” and the condition is expected to last at least 12 months or result in death. Although 
medical proof is needed to show their inability to work, eligibility is subject to manipulation by applicants. 
In this case, use of genetic information can improve the accuracy of the disability determination and thereby 
more effectively target the payments, with less manipulation.
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welfare–reducing attributes. For example, 
a gene may reduce one’s risk of cancer but 
increase one’s risk of some other illness. 
Such effects would have to be netted out. 
Similarly, if an individual had a genetic 
marker for several expensive but nonfatal 
diseases, but also had a gene for longevity, 
that grim combination would also need to 
be taken into account.29 It is also likely that 
many of the various genes that correlate 
with traits that we regard as distributively 
signifi cant, and, hence, the endowment 
tax indices and sub–indices based on those 
genes, are also correlated with each other. 
Thus, for example, the genetic profi le that 
correlates positively with “good judg-
ment,” if there were such a thing, might 
also be be associated statistically with 
“low risk of lung cancer.” Or maybe not. 
But this sort of interactive effect would 
have to be worked out. 
As it turns out, there is in fact a strong 
positive correlation between health status 
and earnings and, thus, probably also with 
earnings potential.30 This fact implies that 
an endowment tax based on the potential 
health index alone would also automati-
cally capture some of the differences in 
earning potential. Put differently, an 
individual’s genetic health status by itself 
might well be a useful tag. The correlation 
between health and income, however, is 
neither perfect nor universal. Some people 
with good health genes will have low 
earning power, and some with bad health 
genes will be high earners.31 Whether the 
benefi ts of fi ne–tuning the tags to adjust 
for these possibilities would exceed the 
costs of doing so is an open question.
Even if an index of the sort we are 
imagining were created, presumably sci-
ence would continue to develop over time, 
and more information would emerge on 
the connections between various genes 
and potential earnings or potential health. 
Also, the “tractability” of the factors could 
change. There could also be changes 
in the relative market value of various 
abilities or the costs of various illnesses. 
Thus, as mentioned above, having the 
good–at–math gene might be extremely 
valuable during one historical period, and 
then much less valuable in another. As a 
result, periodic adjustments to individu-
als’ endowment indices and sub–indices 
would have to be made by the taxing 
authority if the accuracy of the indices 
were to be kept up to date. In theory, this 
could be handled in year–to–year adjust-
ments to an individual’s tax liability, as 
the overall index is recalculated for each 
individual based on the most current 
science available. Of course, some level 
of inaccuracy in the indices would be 
acceptable, a fact that suggests that con-
stant updating may not be required. The 
fact, however, that the genetic endowment 
index, and, thus, the endowment tax, 
could change from year to year could 
be seen as a grounds for criticizing the 
endowment tax idea, and for preferring 
an income or consumption tax, which do 
not require continual modifi cations based 
on scientifi c progress.32 
29 The possibility of a longevity gene creates special complications. For example, imagine that, if an individual 
has this gene, her life expectancy is fi ve years longer than the average. Now, if we are implementing a genetic 
endowment tax that is based on ability to earn as well as healthcare expenditures, should this person pay 
an extra tax (because she will be around longer to make more money) or receive a transfer (since she will be 
around longer and have greater consumption needs)? 
30 See, for example, Smith (1999).
31 If, counterfactually, the correlation were to go the other way (if high earners tended to be less healthy), the two 
indices would have to be netted against each other in some way, and the use of the health tag alone might be 
problematic. One could even imagine a situation in which the optimal transfer would be from the (on average 
rich) sick to the (on average poor) healthy, or in the opposite direction, depending on the relative magnitude 
of the two indices. 
32 Although the optimal income tax would change as new evidence became available, such as new information 
about the elasticity of taxable income at various income levels or on the distribution of earning ability.
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It is important here to emphasize that 
these genetic indices would, at best, 
refl ect estimates of potential future earn-
ings and future health. That is just how 
genes work. Although there are some 
diseases that seem to be wholly caused 
by a person’s genes (Huntington’s disease 
being the most famous example), most of 
the information that genes provide about 
health (and presumably about future 
earnings as well) would be estimates of 
probabilities; and the actual future health 
or earnings of an individual will depend 
on a combination of genetic predisposi-
tion and factors that bear on how the 
genome is “expressed,” which can include 
choices that the individual makes as well 
as pure brute luck. Thus, just as having 
the lung–cancer gene (if one exists) would 
probably only mean that a person has a 
higher–than–average chance of getting 
lung cancer, having the good–at–math 
gene would only mean that a person has 
a higher–than–average chance of turning 
out to be a math whiz. 
The Market Response to the Spread of 
Genetic Information and the Potential 
Government Counter Responses 
Whether or not tax–and–transfer policy 
reacts to the availability of genetic infor-
mation, private markets almost certainly 
will, unless the government steps in to 
prevent it. In this section we discuss some 
of the possible market responses, the 
benefi ts and costs of regulation of private 
use of this information, and whether these 
market responses suggest a reassessment 
of a gene–based tax–and–transfer system.
Imagine that the scientific advances 
in identifying genes that determine or 
infl uence potential earnings and potential 
health status described above become a 
reality and that such information becomes 
available to private parties, not merely to 
the individuals themselves (who might 
or might not want to know what their 
genetic future holds), but also to potential 
employers and insurers. We can imagine 
both employers and insurers putting this 
information to use. For example, potential 
employers would have an incentive to use 
the various genetic predictors of ability 
(such as those correlated with aptitude in 
math and abstract reasoning, good judg-
ment, perseverance, amiable personality, 
and so on) to help them select the right 
people for the right jobs. Likewise, if there 
are industrial jobs that are best performed 
by people with special resistance to certain 
toxins, or jobs best held by people with 
specialized aptitudes, genetic testing 
may facilitate such effi cient, social–wel-
fare–enhancing job sorting. Indeed, with 
personality and aptitude tests that some 
employers already use, this type of job–
sorting already occurs, though perhaps 
with less accuracy than would be the case 
if the genetic markers could also be used. 
Genetically informed job sorting, thus, 
could well increase overall social welfare. 
Not all private uses of genetic information, 
however, would necessarily be considered 
benign. Employers and insurers might 
also want to use some genetic markers in 
ways that society regards as illegitimate 
reasons for distinguishing among people 
in employment decisions, and the law 
could prohibit the use of those markers—
just as the law already prohibits the use 
of such criteria as race, gender, and age 
in employment decisions.33 In addition, 
employers, and especially health insur-
ers, would be very interested in an indi-
vidual’s potential health status, although 
not every employer and insurer would 
necessarily be equally interested in the 
same combination of health–related genes. 
For example, insurers who offer standard 
33 For example, some may object to the use of a genetic test for potential aptitude in place of an actual aptitude 
test. However, presumably an employer would use the combination of genetic and actual aptitude tests that 
would produce the most accurate overall prediction of likely job performance. 
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health insurance coverage would want 
to know an individual’s genetic predis-
position to various diseases that produce 
significant lifetime medical expenses. 
Indeed, such information would allow 
them to charge extremely “accurate” (in 
terms of actuarial accuracy) premiums 
to very narrowly drawn risk pools. Of 
course, for those individuals with a very 
strong genetic predisposition to the most 
expensive diseases, health insurance may 
well become cost–prohibitive. In addition, 
insofar as employers provide health insur-
ance to their employees, or they serve as 
the underwriters of self–insured health 
benefi t plans for their employees, as is 
often currently the case, the two effects 
would exacerbate each other: employers 
would be inclined not to insure, or hire 
at all, those with genetically predicted 
poor health.34 
The market process just described, 
at least when it occurs in the insurance 
context, is often referred to as risk seg-
regation or risk classification. It is an 
almost inevitable result of competition 
among employers and insurers. And it 
is normally considered to be effi ciency 
enhancing. Accurate risk segregation, 
for example, helps insurance markets to 
function by allowing insurers to combat 
the problem of adverse selection due to 
asymmetric information, the tendency 
of relatively high–risk individuals to 
select into insurance pools, driving up 
the average cost of the pool and pricing 
some people out of the market. Obvi-
ously, the problem of adverse selection 
could become much worse in a world in 
which individuals themselves have access 
to their own genetic health profi les, but 
insurers do not. Thus, if individuals who 
might have a genetic predisposition to 
certain debilitating and expensive dis-
eases had access to that information and 
insurance companies did not, health and 
disability insurance markets might not 
be sustainable (depending on how many 
individuals had those genes.) Genetic 
risk segregation can prevent this sort of 
collapse of insurance pools due to geneti-
cally motivated adverse selection. More 
generally, fi ne–tuned risk segregation in 
insurance markets facilitates the pricing 
of insurance according to individual risk 
characteristics.
To the extent, however, that differences 
in health risks are genetically determined 
(and, thus, are outside of the control of 
the individual), there is an obvious ten-
sion between the notion that individuals 
should pay insurance premiums that are 
actuarially fair (that refl ect their expected 
costs to the insurance company) and 
society’s concern with distributive justice, 
discussed above. That is, we mentioned 
above the fact that lawmakers might 
decide to increase social welfare through 
transfers from those with better genetic 
health prospects to those with worse 
genetic health prospects, just as lawmak-
ers might decide to make transfers from 
high potential earners to low potential 
earners. The point of both sorts of trans-
fers is to equalize the social marginal 
utility of income across individuals, 
and thereby maximize overall utility 
or welfare. When insurance companies 
can charge premiums that refl ect geneti-
cally determined risks, however, it cuts 
in exactly the opposite direction. Rather 
than transferring from the better off to 
the less well off, genetically “accurate” 
insurance premiums reproduce the sta-
tus quo: those with better genes pay less, 
while those with worse genes pay more. 
Again, this is the result of competition 
among insurers. 
34 Life insurance markets would also be affected. Life insurance companies would use the health–status sub–
indices relating to longevity to determine how much to charge for life insurance premiums, and individuals 
with genetic markers for high risk of cancer and heart disease would either be forced to pay very high life 
insurance premiums or go uninsured. 
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Given this world of insurers compet-
ing to price their policies to maximize 
profi ts and of employers seeking to place 
employees in the jobs that maximize the 
employers’ profits, and assuming for 
now that society (again, on welfarist or 
utilitarian grounds) wishes to reduce 
some of the inequality between the geneti-
cally rich and genetically poor, there are 
at least two obvious policy responses to 
the spread of genetic information. First, 
we could allow genetic risk segregation 
and job sorting to take place and then 
redistribute through a direct tax–and–
transfer policy, as outlined in the previ-
ous section, perhaps through a tagging 
system added to an existing income tax 
regime; this would achieve the effi ciency 
gains in insurance and labor markets 
without any unwanted distributional 
consequences. Alternatively, we could 
forgo the tagging approach and instead 
adopt insurance and employment laws 
forbidding genetic discrimination—that 
is, forbidding the use of genetic infor-
mation in employment and insurance 
contexts. 
At fi rst blush, forbidding the use of 
genetic information by insurers would 
seem to have much the same effect as 
allowing them to use the genetic infor-
mation but then enacting a redistributive 
tax–and–transfer system to undo the 
effect of the insurance discrimination. 
What’s more, the anti–discrimination 
approach has the benefit of automati-
cally calculating the welfare equalizing 
amount of transfer that occurs within 
the insurance pool; that is, the transfer 
(or cross–subsidization) from low–risk to 
high–risk individuals will exactly offset 
the genetically determined difference in 
pre–insurance well–being.35 This type of 
indirect transfer regime, however, has 
some problems. First, there may be some 
fairness concerns with redistributing 
only from the genetically lucky to the 
genetically unlucky within an insurance 
pool that does not include everyone in 
society. That is, if the tax–and–transfer 
system were used to equalize between 
the genetically healthy and genetically 
unhealthy, the redistribution could be 
from everyone in society with the good 
genes to everyone in society with the 
bad genes. In general, spreading the 
redistribution over a larger base reduces 
the overall welfare cost of the redistribu-
tive regime. By contrast, if the regula-
tory approach is used—causing indirect 
transfers within insurance pools due to 
the rule against genetic discrimination—
redistribution is more haphazard; it will 
be more effective for people in large pools 
than for those in small pools. Second, if 
insurers are forbidden to use genetic 
information but insurance applicants 
can use it, the potential for adverse selec-
tion is obvious. Third, if insurers cannot 
use genetic information, moral hazard 
problems arise as well. For example, 
if there were a gene that revealed only 
a predisposition to a certain disease 
(say, heart disease or cancer), insurers 
might be able to use that information to 
encourage those who are insured to take 
special steps to reduce their risks, such 
as through diet or exercise.36 Forbidding 
the use of that information could actually 
impede appropriate medical treatment 
in that case. 
All of these factors suggest that, if 
the government is going to adopt a 
redistributive response to the spread of 
genetic information, the best approach 
might be to allow insurers and employ-
ers to use genetic information, but then 
adopt an explicit genetic endowment 
tax regime (via tagging) that reduces the 
inequality between the genetic haves 
35 This conclusion assumes that the insurance fully covers the risk that is insured.
36 Note that the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 does allow insurance companies to urge 
patients to take appropriate genetic tests so as to help fi nd the best, cost–effective therapy.
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and have–nots.37 Interestingly, the law 
in the U.S. seems to have gone the other 
way. As we have already noted, there is 
no explicit genetic endowment tax–and–
transfer regime currently in the U.S., while 
most state governments in the U.S. have 
adopted rules forbidding insurers from 
using genetic testing in their underwrit-
ing procedures, and some have done the 
same with employment practices.38 What 
is interesting for present purposes is the 
following observation: insofar as we 
have laws forbidding the use of genetic 
information, there is a sense in which we 
already have policy that in some ways mimics 
a form of genetic endowment tax, though an 
imperfect one (and perhaps not even the best 
one we could have). 
This fact should, in our view, lead to a 
reframing of the debate over the endow-
ment tax idea. That is, given the reality 
of the marketplace, and given the state 
anti–discrimination laws that have been 
adopted in response to the spread of 
genetic information, we already have 
policy akin to a form of endowment tax 
regime, one that is administered indirectly 
through employment and insurance mar-
kets. Thus, those who object to the “forced 
labor” or “wage slavery” associated with 
a direct endowment tax should also be 
concerned with the forced–labor effect of 
an indirect endowment tax. Thus, when an 
insurer, due to a state law against genetic 
discrimination, is forced to charge a genet-
ically healthy individual a higher pre-
mium than she would have been charged 
if the insurer had been allowed to charge 
lower, actuarially fair (and genetically dis-
criminatory) premiums, there would be 
a sort of “income effect.” The individual 
with the “healthy” genetic makeup would 
have to work harder or longer hours at 
her job, or might even have to switch to 
a higher–paying job, to achieve the same 
level of consumption that she would 
under an actuarially fair insurance regime. 
As with the direct endowment tax, there 
would be no distortion in her choices, no 
substitution effect, as the “tax” (that is, 
the difference between her actual insur-
ance premium and the actuarially fair 
insurance premium) is lump–sum based 
on the individual’s genetic profi le. But 
there could certainly be an income effect, 
of the sort that has raised concerns among 
endowment tax critics. 
Thus, at this point, the relevant question 
is not whether to adopt an endowment 
tax regime, but whether to alter the one 
we effectively already have (by mak-
ing genetic discrimination fully legal in 
all contexts). What the next subsection 
points out is that, even if policymak-
ers chose to alter the existing indirect 
genetic endowment regime (that is, to 
repeal all of the laws forbidding the use 
of genetic information in insurance and 
employment markets), the market may 
yet respond again—this time with its own 
form of an endowment tax–and–trans-
fer system, which we call endowment 
insurance.
Genetic Endowment Insurance
Let us for now assume that policymak-
ers do decide to repeal the existing implicit 
genetic endowment transfer regime (by 
repealing laws against genetic discrimi-
nation) and decide also not to pursue 
an explicit genetic endowment tagging 
regime of the sort described above. What 
this means is that employers and insurers 
are allowed to require genetic testing of 
their applicants, and are allowed to use 
37 Note, however that there is less of a case for using an anti–discrimination principle instead of a genetic endow-
ment tax if (a) there is universal compulsory health insurance (eliminating the adverse selection problem and 
the concern about unfairly burdening a small pool of contributors) and (b) the anti–discrimination principle 
is applied only to diseases or conditions that are fully genetically determined (such as Huntington’s disease) 
where there is no, or relatively little, moral hazard concern (see Logue and Avraham (2003)).
38 See sources cited above in footnote 15, and also Rothstein (2001).
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the information as they see fi t. Assume 
also, of course, that individuals can have 
themselves tested and learn their own 
genetic makeup. One signifi cant result of 
this set of assumptions that has signifi cant 
consequences is that, at the moment an 
individual is born—indeed earlier, at the 
moment of conception (or the moment 
when sperm and egg combine to create 
a new set of chromosomes with its own 
complement of genetic material and that 
material can be analyzed without harm 
to the fetus) or upon genetic testing of 
the parents—much can be learned about 
that individual’s future prospects. Indeed, 
assuming technological advances have 
given us the genetic endowment indices 
described above, we can know whether 
the individual is, overall, in terms of her 
inherited genetic endowment, rich, poor, 
or average. 
In the absence of a genetic endowment 
tax regime, what might we expect to hap-
pen? One possibility is the rise of a private 
market in genetic endowment insurance.39 
One way to see this point is from the 
perspective of a risk–averse couple that 
is thinking about having a child. They 
know their own genetic endowments 
and, thus, have the ability to estimate the 
probability distribution of possible genetic 
endowments for their child. But they can-
not be sure of exactly what genetic draw 
their child will receive. Putting aside for 
now the prospect of genetic engineer-
ing, there is some irreducible degree of 
uncertainty as to what their child’s mix 
of genetic material will be. This concerns 
the prospective parents both because they 
care about the child and want him or 
her to have a good life, or at least not to 
have to bear the burden of a low genetic 
endowment, and because they know that 
their own prospects are tied to those of the 
child, since the child’s consumption and 
medical needs will be their responsibility 
(at least for 18 years or so) and since they 
may be hoping the child will become rich 
and support them in their old age. So this 
genetic score means a lot to them.
Enter the genetic endowment insurer, 
which offers to sell the couple a policy that 
covers the family against the risk that the 
child will end up with a below–average 
genetic endowment. The policy is written 
and sold before conception, with a pre-
mium based presumably on the parent’s 
own genetic endowment indices. After 
conception, when the fetus’s genes can 
be tested, the test is given, and the policy 
either pays off or it does not. If the child 
is found to have a low genetic endow-
ment, the family receives a lump–sum 
payment, which the parents can then 
invest in a deferred annuity on behalf of 
the child, the proceeds of which can be 
used to fund the extra medical expenses 
or to make up for loss of lifetime earnings 
due to the child’s genetic endowment. 
Thus, a transfer is made to the families of 
the genetically unlucky children and, in 
a sense (because only the unlucky ones 
receive the insurance payout, though all 
pay into the pool), a tax is imposed on the 
families of the genetically lucky children. 
Of course, if policymakers are concerned 
that the parents of the genetically lucky 
children will squander the insurance 
39 Another possible repercussion is the rise of genetic engineering or eugenics, the incentive for which will de-
pend on the genetic regulatory and tax–and–transfer policies in place, and any behavioral response to which 
belies our labeling such policies as having no effect on behavior other than an income effect. It is also possible, 
of course, that in some future world, technology may enable prospective parents to choose the DNA of their 
children or at least to have some level of control or choice in the matter. To the extent that were to happen, 
genetic markers, even if statistically correlated with well–being, would no longer be ideal tax tags, as they 
would no longer be immutable from an ex ante perspective.  A discussion of the ramifi cations of this, and 
other related issues such as selective abortion, for our argument is best left for another time, beyond noting 
that using a genetic tag in the tax–and–transfer system will reduce the incentive to undertake these gene–im-
proving activities and on average reduces the long–term average genetic endowment in the same way that 
an income tax affects income–producing activities. 
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money, they could adopt a rule requiring 
that the insurance proceeds be invested 
and spent a certain way, but this idea 
again takes us down the road of govern-
ment intervention. The more government 
involvement there is, the more restriction 
there is on how the money is spent and 
perhaps on the amount of premiums 
that can be collected, the more a world of 
privately provided genetic endowment 
insurance begins to look like a regime of 
direct genetic endowment taxation of the 
sort described above, but administered 
through private insurers as tax collectors.40
The idea of genetic endowment insur-
ance may seem farfetched, but it is less 
outlandish than one might think. When-
ever a parent purchases life insurance on 
their young child, they are effectively pur-
chasing genetic endowment insurance of 
sorts. That is, they are effectively purchas-
ing insurance against the possibility that 
the child will someday reveal a genetic 
predisposition to an illness that will make 
him uninsurable. This is explicitly how 
the insurance is marketed.41 It is only a 
few steps from this relatively common 
form of insurance to a broader market 
for insurance against bad health or ability 
genes. What is interesting about the idea 
for present purposes is that such genetic 
endowment insurance would, if feasible, con-
stitute a privately provided, wholly voluntary 
system of endowment taxation and transfer. 
To the extent the government gets 
involved in the problem of genetic 
inequality—and either adopts an explicit 
form of genetic endowment adjustment to 
the income tax or (through, for example, 
antidiscrimination rules) adopts regula-
tory policies that reproduce many of the 
effects of a form of genetic endowment 
tax—the demand for, and, thus, the mar-
ket for, genetic endowment insurance 
would disappear. What this observation 
suggests is that privately provided genetic 
endowment or a system–of–government–
provided genetic endowment taxes and 
transfers are substitutes for each other. 
This should come as no surprise. It has 
often been observed that the existing 
tax–and–transfer regimes are akin to 
insurance for the as–yet unborn against 
the possibility that they will be born with 
a low endowment.42  
Note that both government–provided 
and privately provided genetic endow-
ment insurance covers only the risk of an 
unfavorable genetic draw, and does not 
provide insurance against other types 
of risk.  For example, even if there were 
a genetic endowment tax–and–transfer 
regime or alternatively if there were a pri-
vate market in genetic endowment insur-
ance, neither form of protection would 
address the risk that the economy might 
change over time to render an individual’s 
initial endowment less valuable or the risk 
40 This discussion highlights one interesting aspect of the rise of genetic endowment indices that we have not 
yet discussed, and that is absent from the literatures on endowment taxation and genetic discrimination: each 
time there is a new discovery linking a particular gene to a particular disease, that discovery has the qualities 
of a one–time lump–sum wealth tax on all individuals who have that gene, whether born or unborn. That is, 
if you are alive at the time the discovery is made, then, in the absence of a system of redistribution or cross 
subsidization, you are essentially subject to a lump–sum tax equal to the present value of the lifetime expected 
costs of having that gene. (And if you have any plans to produce children, the tax must be multiplied by 
some inheritance factor.) This conclusion, however, assumes the absence of a market in genetic endowment 
insurance.
41 For example, see www.afadvantage.com, where the pitch for such insurance is “No matter what health prob-
lems may develop in years to come, the policy cannot be cancelled.”
42 Sinn (2003) makes such an argument, stressing the possibility that cross–country mobility of individuals and 
capital will erode the ability of countries to provide such insurance. Compare the classic argument of Harsanyi 
(1955), who develops an approach to optimal progressivity based on risk–averse individuals choosing the 
tax–and–transfer system in an “orignal position” where no individual has any information about what ability 
they will draw from a known distribution. 
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that the individual might come down with 
some debilitating disease, whatever her 
genetic predisposition for such a disease 
might be.  To put the point differently, how 
an individual’s life turns out, in terms of 
overall well–being (including income, 
health, etc.), is a function both of her 
initial genetic endowment and post–birth 
brute luck, as well as many other factors; 
genetic endowment insurance—whether 
government– or privately provided—only 
addresses the fi rst.43 Of course, other types 
of government transfer programs, as 
well as other types of private insurance 
policies, might serve as insurance against 
these other sorts of risk.  For example, the 
progressive income tax and privately pur-
chased insurance contracts provide cover-
age against the possibility of extreme ex 
post outcomes.  Such conventional forms 
of insurance, however, raise all of the 
familiar moral hazard problems associated 
with standard forms of insurance; further 
discussion of such insurance is beyond the 
scope of this particular essay.
CONCLUSION
Advances in genetic research raise the 
prospect of loosening the tradeoff between 
progressivity and effi ciency by allowing tax 
liability (or transfer eligibility) to be based 
in part on immutable characteristics of 
individuals (“tags”) that are correlated with 
their expected lot in life. Use of genetic tags 
would reduce reliance on tax bases (such 
as income) that are subject to individual 
choices and, therefore, subject to ineffi cient 
distortion to those choices. Taking advan-
tage of this information will allow policy 
outcomes that dominate the outcome menu 
available without using genetic information 
as a tag—everyone can be made better off. 
The same distributional outcome can be 
attained with less cost to the economy.
Thus, our first contribution to the 
endowment tax literature is the observa-
tion that the spread of genetic information 
bears on optimal tax design, to the extent 
that genetic information is observable 
and provides nearly immutable tags for 
overall well–being. Our second contribu-
tion is to point out that, as genetic infor-
mation spreads to private employers and 
insurers (and assuming that, in contrast 
to the current situation, the law did not 
effectively prevent them from using such 
information), the case for adopting some 
kind of a genetic endowment tax becomes 
more compelling, as genetic inequalities 
would be exacerbated by market forces. If 
society desires to reduce or eliminate such 
inequalities, to maximize overall utility by 
shifting resources from the genetic rich 
to the genetic poor, at least two potential 
policy instruments are available: a direct 
genetic endowment tax–and–transfer 
regime or a regulatory regime that forbids 
genetic discrimination and forces genetic 
cross–subsidization. 
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